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Executive Summary  
 
In Hungary in the last couple of years we have witnessed the rise of radical racist discourse. The 
radical rightwing party succeeded in setting the terms of political debate and bringing the Roma 
question back to centre stage. This resulted in calls to ‘break taboos’ to allow for a sincere biologically 
and a culturally informed discussion of difference. Both forms of discourse lead to exclusion.   
 
The aim of this case study is to better understand the strengthening of the radical right in Hungary, its 
openly anti-Roma discourses, and the reactions of mainstream political actors to this radicalism. We 
examine the media coverage of two murders, one in which the Roma were the perpetrators and in the 
other in which they were the victims. We also review public debate on the question of Roma 
integration and the end of political correctness as it appeared in the mainstream media. The two 
murders are significant for understanding how the Roma question became increasingly racialised. The 
first incident we have ‘Olaszliszka’ after the locale where the murder took place. In 2006, a, non-
Roma teacher was lynched by a group of Roma. Our second case is ‘Tatárszentgyörgy’, also named 
after the locale where the murder occurred.  In 2009, a Roma father and his son were murdered by a 
number of Hungarian men who were known for their neo-Nazi political allegiances. Both murders 
were followed by serious local conflicts between the Roma and non-Roma actors, and both drew 
unprecedented media attention that set off national political debates. Our third case addresses the 
aftermath of the media representation and the public debates generated by the two incidents. The 
conclusion drawn by a number of intellectuals was that politically correct discourse should be 
abandoned, as they viewed it as an impediment to ‘genuine’ dialogue on these important issues. This 
in turn legitimated the further racialisation of the Roma question by virtually all parties to the debate.   
 
Our interest throughout is in examining the ways in which both radical and mainstream discourse have 
contributed to the reproduction and legitimation of anti-Roma attitudes and actions in Hungary. Our 
analysis considers the radical right’s discourses on these issues and how they ultimately fed into more 
moderate or mainstream political and public debate. 
 
In our case study we analyse media representations of the two murder cases (with the Roma as the 
perpetrators in the first one (case 1.) and the victims in the second one (case 2.)); we then conclude 
with a debate on ‘Roma integration and the end of political correctness’ (case 3.) as it appeared in left 
orientated papers. Our main purpose is to show the range of reactions to the radical right and how the 
Roma issue was thematised through engagement with these two murder cases. This sheds light on the 
ways in which radical right discourses spread to mainstream discourses. For the first two cases we 
included the following media: kuruc.info.hu, one of the most important radical right-wing internet 
web-sites in Hungary, the left-wing but mainstream Népszabadság, and the right-wing (also 
mainstream) Magyar Nemzet. For our third case we compiled a database by choosing one particular 
debate published in a weekly political and economic magazine, Heti Világ Gazdaság. For case 1. and 
2. we conducted keyword searches – looking for the name of Olaszliszka and Tatárszentgyörgy – in 
both papers and the website to compile a dataset containing all relevant articles published since the 
incidents occurred. From the dataset we selected opinion articles and looked for discursive strategies 
employed in the articles. For case 3, we used all articles of one particular debate launched by the 
editors of hvg.hu entitled: Why don’t Hungarian Roma integrate?   
 
Our analysis revealed intolerant discourses not only from the radical right media but from the 
conservative as well.  In these media the Roma are characterised as biologically different: their innate 
inclination for crime means that they cannot be tolerated. The leftist newspaper we sampled 
emphasizes tolerance through norms of human rights and non-discrimination. In the integration debate 
we found that the emphasis switching to the Roma’s purported cultural distinctiveness. This more  
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culturalist interpretation was nevertheless still exclusionary in its effects, even if it was coming from 
the left. The main distinction between the left on the one hand and the right and radical right on the 
other was in the degree of their exclusion.  
 
We also consider how these discourses relate to our non-tolerace–tolerance–acceptance model. We 
have argued that both kuruc.info.hu and Magyar Nemzet displayed intolerant discursive strategies that 
invoked the putative biological differences of the Roma. The Roma are not deserving of toleration 
given their genetically innate inclination to crime. Népszabadság in contrast used discursive strategies 
that emphasised tolerance through a respect of basic human rights and non-discrimination. In the 
integration debate we found that the ‘end of political correctness’ and ‘peculiar Roma culture’ topoi 
were used to stress the cultural distinctiveness of the Roma (not in genetic but cultural terms). The 
recognition of this distinctiveness, however, does not point to the integration of the Roma but on the 
contrary, to their continued exclusion, as was the case with kuruc.info.hu and Magyar Nemzet as well. 
The main element of the Roma’s distinctiveness is their deliberate exclusion.  
 
These findings point to a growing tendency of non-tolerant public discourse in Hungary that spread to 
almost all corners of the political spectrum. There are several political and social processes that 
contribute to this trend of non-toleration. First, the rise of radical racist discourses which has 
accompanied the political successes of the radical right wing party, Jobbik, has set the political and 
media agenda by thematising the ‘Roma question’.  
 
Second, non-radical political and public figures from both the left and right have responded to this 
thematisation of the ‘Roma question’ in a way that has not excluded non-tolerant racist discourses. 
Indeed, they have often been complicit in legitimating non-tolerant discourses. By acting as partners in 
‘breaking taboos’, they have simultaneously been breaking with the tolerant language that supposedly 
accompanied those taboos. 
 
Third, in the current non-tolerant climate, accepting the (cultural) difference of other ethnic groups has 
become impossible. ‘Roma cultural difference’ instead was ‘accepted’, though in a somewhat 
ambiguous way: its existence was acknowledged, but as grounds for deliberate exclusion. This is 
similar to what we witnessed in France in the 1970s when the new right misappropriated the slogan of 
the left, ‘le droit à la différence’ for their own purposes, claiming that immigrants have the right to 
difference because their culture is so different from French culture that integration is not a possibility. 
Similarly, in the UK, cultural racists have claimed that other (immigrant) cultures cannot be 
integrated. 
 
Finally, in Hungary as in some other post-socialist countries, non-tolerance has troublingly become a 
rally cry of a good number of political and public actors, often irrespective of political affiliation. State 
institutions, political parties and the media have joined forces to fuel suspicion of Roma difference, be 
it biological or cultural. As a result, tolerance as a value and discourse has suffered, embraced by only 
a handful of actors increasingly marginal to the political mainstream.  
 
Hungary is thus a paradox. It recognises the Roma as culturally distinct; indeed, it reifies and 
essentialises their cultural distinctiveness. But this recognition is not based on respect, as we see in the 
ACCEPT framework.  Rather, it is based on racism:  the Roma are not just culturally distinct, they are 
culturally inferior, and that cultural inferiority prevents their full incorporation into Hungarian society.  
This is intolerance, feebly masked as cultural recognition. This intolerance may have the radical right 
as its strongest advocates, but what is perhaps most disturbing from our analysis is the extent to which 
the racism voiced by the radical right is used by the mainstream media and political actors as well.  
There is widespread consensus that Roma problem is just that: a problem, and the problem is with the 
Roma, and their deficient culture.  This in a sense relieves majority Hungarians of responsibility for 
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accommodating the Roma.  Indeed, it becomes an argument for the non-tolerance of the Roma: their 
cultural deficiencies must not be tolerated any longer. 
 
This profound intolerance raises important questions about the relationship between racism and 
intolerance. To be sure, racism can be found in countries of immigration as well.  But whilst this 
racism typically only becomes explicit on the fringes in these other countries (claimed by the radical 
right or voiced on extremist websites), the Hungarian case shows how racism has gone mainstream in 
Hungary. The recent incidents we have examined in Hungary have been unscrupulously used to 
legitimate racism in ways that greatly expands the scope of intolerance. 
 
Keywords 
 
radical right, media discourse, racism, political correctness, Roma  
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1. Introduction  
 
The aim of this study is to examine the strengthening of the radical right in Hungary, its anti-Roma 
dimensions, and how these discourses were received by mainstream political actors. We will proceed 
by considering the media coverage of two murder cases, one in which Roma were the perpetrators, and 
the other in which they were its victims. In the third part of our analysis we will turn to public debate 
on the question of Roma integration more generally, with a particular focus on calls to bring an end to 
political correctness as an impediment to genuine debate on these issues. The two murders and their 
treatment in the media are significant for understanding how the Roma question became increasingly 
racialised. The first of these murders is labelled ‘Olaszliszka’ after the village where the murder took 
place.  In 2006, a teacher was lynched by a group of Roma.  The second case is called 
‘Tatárszentgyörgy’, again after the locale where the murder occurred.  Here in 2009 a Roma father and 
his son were murdered by a number of Hungarian men who were later discovered to have neo-Nazi 
leanings. Both murders occasioned serious conflict between the Roma and non-Roma, and both 
attracted unprecedented media attention, setting off in turn national political debates. Our third case 
considers the media’s handling of both of the incidents and the discussion on the Roma question that 
the murders spurred. It is here where we see it proposed that politically correct language and discourse 
should be abandoned insofar as it is portrayed as an obstacle to genuine debate on these important 
issues. Our analysis of these examples will reveal how both mainstream and radical right media have 
complicit in the reproduction and legitimation of anti-Roma attitudes and actions in Hungary. Our 
analysis begins with the radical right and then considers how they are received by mainstream political 
actors. We conclude by examining how these discourses map onto the non-tolerance – tolerance – 
acceptance framework.  
Roma exclusion   
 
One of the main factors contributing to the rise of the extreme right in Hungary in recent years is the 
inadequate and unsuccessful handling of the social integration of the Roma minority by all successive 
governments since the regime change. This has not only contributed to the Roma’s increased socio-
economic marginalisation, it has also made as a consequence the Roma question one of the most 
important topics in the Hungarian political life. But this is a problem without a solution:  the 
institutional framework for Roma political activism is unable to provide for their effective 
participation in mainstream politics. Roma interests are thus either overlooked completely or 
manipulated and represented by a small handful of civil organisations claiming to represent equal 
treatment and rights. Roma integration and inclusion has been on the political agenda since the regime 
change that occurred in 1989-90. But just as quickly as the Roma question became a topic of debate, 
the situation of the Roma deteriorated precipitously. The economic transition of the 1990s created a 
new and stable underclass (Ladányi-Szelényi 2002). This population, the losers of the transition, is 
characterised by intractable unemployment, low educational attainment and rural poverty. About half 
of this emergent underclass population are of Roma origin. Their social situation has continued to 
deteriorate over the course of the past 25 years.  
 
This underclass is concentrated in small villages where tensions with the lower middle class have been 
intensifying. Although the roots of this conflict is primarily socio-economic, they are often represented 
in ‘ethnicised’ or ‘racialised’ ways. Thus conflict between segments of the population occupying 
different socio-economic positions come to be understood and interpreted as conflict between the 
Roma and the non-Roma. The last twenty years have thus witnessed the racialisation of conflicts in 
these marginalised rural areas.      
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State policies aimed at remedying this situation have not achieved their desired effects; indeed, some 
of these policies have even contributed to the further ethnic segregation of the Roma. The 
racisalisation of social integration problems has multiple causes. For one, the Hungarian welfare 
system has been unable to reduce social inequalities or to prevent the formation and the reproduction 
of the underclass. Second, the social integration of the Roma population, although supposedly 
prioritised by successive governments, has in fact been viewed as a political liability by these 
governments, lacking the will to tackle the problem in a serious way. Third, the decentralisation of the 
Hungarian system of local administration has provided local governments with excessive authorities 
which are able to override other principles of non-discrimination and human rights when dealing with 
the Roma.   
The rise of the radical right and the Roma question  
 
Though different in its origins, the rise of the radical right in Hungary is unrelated to what is 
happening in many Western Europe states where the multiculturalist model has come under increased 
scrutiny and criticism. In Hungary, however, the success of the far right is to a large extent due to their 
effective exploitation of Roma issues. Both whilst campaigning for parliamentary election and since 
capturing 16% of the vote, Jobbik (The Movement for a Better Hungary) has successfully thematised 
the Roma question, putting it on the mainstream political agenda. Jobbik’s first electoral success came 
in the European elections in 2009; a year later they captured 16% of the vote in Hungary’s 
parliamentary elections, nearly edging out the former governing Socialists (who received just 17% of 
the vote). At the same time a growing number of extra-parliamentary and sometimes paramilitary 
groups have also became active, some with close links to Jobbik. Indeed, mainstream political actors 
and the media have responded to Jobbik discourses on Roma, but often in uncritical ways. Jobbik’s 
anti-Roma rhetoric was crucial to its electoral success (Karácsony-Róna 2010). Its forceful and clear 
message of non-tolerance of the Roma assumes various discursive forms (such as talk about ‘Gypsy 
crime’) but can also be found in an expanding of array of public actions (particularly in marches 
organised by a number of paramilitary groups
1
 with the purpose of restoring order in settlements with 
high Roma concentrations).  
 
Support for the radical right doubled between 2002 and 2009 (Juhász and Krekó 2011). There are 
numerous factors behind the rapid rise and success of the far right in Hungary: popular attitudes 
toward democratic institutions, the state, and the government and politics in general. Xenophobic 
attitudes can also be viewed as a determinant (but also as an effect) of the rise of the extreme right. 
More generally, economic decline, poor governance, interethnic tensions and the media’s handling of 
the issue has also contributed to the strengthening of the radical right (Gimes et al. 2009). The 
consolidation of democratic institutions in Hungary since 1989 has only been partial:  popular support 
for democracy and participation in civil activities remains weak. Indeed, low levels of trust in 
democratic institutions
2
 persist. Hungarians are equally critical of the both the ruling elite and the 
government. Survey research that reveals high levels of popular dissatisfaction with public safety 
issues is attributable in part to an expectation that the state assume a greater role in such matters (itself 
a legacy of the communist past) (Gimes et al. 2009). This is consistent with other research that  
                                                     
1
 The most important of these groups is the Magyar Gárda, the Hungarian Guard . The Hungarian Guard was founded in 
2007 as a cultural association but with links to Jobbik (Jobbik’s president founded the cultural association that established 
Hungarian Guard). The main activities of the Guard include marches against ‘Gypsy crime’ in villages and towns with 
high concetnrations of Roma. After a series of such marches the Guard was banned in 2009. Within a month, however, 
the Guard had reformed, composed larrgely of the same leaders and supporters. Since then, the group has been organising 
similar anti-Roma demonstrations,threatening and provoking the Roma population. The state’s failure to stop their 
activities has helped legitimate these activities.  
2
 Nearly half of the population support the view that democracy is not adequate for maintaining public order.  
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demonstrates that a quarter of the population accepts and supports authoritarian views and political 
rhetoric (Gimes et al. 2009; Juhász and Krekó 2011). These features of public opinion help explain 
how the extreme right is able to fill these gaps by establishing independent organisations that promise 
to restore and maintain public order (Gimes et al. 2009) 
 
Another important factor are the high levels of xenophobia and racism in Hungarian society, amongst 
the highest in Europe and on the increase (Gimes et al. 2009). Anti-Roma attitudes, already strong 
throughout the entire population, have been shown to be significantly stronger amongst supporters of 
extreme right parties Karácsony and Róna 2010, p. 42).  Indeed, anti-Roma attitudes amongst the 
population are more powerful predictors of party affiliation than either anti-establishment or anti-
Semitic attitudes (Karácsony and Róna 2010). Jobbik clearly capitalises on this support base by using 
anti-Roma rhetoric to differentiate itself from the more moderate governing party, Fidesz, whose 
voters tend to share similar attitudes as the Jobbik voters (except with respect to anti-Roma attitudes) 
(Karácsony and Róna 2010).  
 
Whilst general economic decline has contributed to the rise of the radical right, the more recent 
economic crisis has been shown not to be deciding factor in this same regard. Rather, it was the 
political crisis of 2006 and the instability that followed that can be seen to be a more decisive factor in 
the rise of the far right (Gimes et al.  2009). After winning a second term in 2006 (despite poor 
economic governance), the re-elected socialist prime minister privately admitted that his party had lied 
about the country’s economic performance so that it would win the elections. When the speech was 
leaked to the media, a series of demonstrations and riots ensued, demanding the resignation of the 
government. These demonstrations were organised and dominated by the radical right, but included at 
times the participation and backing of mainstream right and centre-right opposition parties.   As the 
socialist government refused to step down, the demonstrations continued for weeks, contributing to the 
air of political instability. 
 
Mainstream political as actors and opinion leaders have reacted ambiguously to the rise of the radical 
right. Their general reticence can be viewed as a silent (and at times not so silent) endorsement of the 
radical right’s intolerance. Indeed, open and explicit challenges to extremism were formulated by only 
a minority of mainstream politicians. Behind the ambiguity and reticence of the majority of 
mainstream political actors lies a profound lack of consensus about what counts as radical and 
therefore unacceptable (Barta 2008).  
 
The mainstream parties’ reasons for their reluctance to denounce the radical right are varied. The 
previously governing Socialist Party, which in the past articulated and defended an anti-fascist 
platform, has become too driven by internal divisions and thus too feeble to have a real impact on 
influencing the political discourse. The next and smaller opposition party, the Greens, has been 
accused of not being straightforward enough in its condemnation of the radical right. The Greens 
claim to want to distance themselves from all established political forces in Hungary (Magyar 2010). 
But as others have argued, ‘if a political party in Hungary wants to adopt a fierce anti-fascist position, 
this party will be, in the public eye, clearly associated with the unpopular [Socialist-Liberal] 
partnership’ (Magyar 2010, p. 7). The governing conservative rightwing party, Fidesz, has never really 
articulated strong anti-fascist discourses, again mainly for political reasons. Both Fidesz and the 
Socialists however, the two main parliamentary factions, whilst careful to criticise the far right, have 
been relentless in blaming each other for the rise of the extreme right. Fidesz suggested that it was in 
the political interest of the MSZP to allow the radical right’s activities so that they would be better 
able to demonise the centre right; the Socialists liked to portray the conservatives as in cahoots with 
the radical right (Gimes et al. 2009).  
 
Problematic interethnic relations have been posited as another factor contributing to the rise of Jobbik. 
These ethnic tensions are in turn attributable to the Roma’s deteriorating economic and social 
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situation. In economically deprived settings, perceived differences between groups become more 
accentuated and ethnicized (Gimes et al. 2009).    
 
Supporters of the radical right cannot however be consistently linked to particular media, although 
they are overrepresented as internet users. This itself is significant because the radical right has created 
an alternative public space on the internet to spread its views. The mainstream media thus mobilises a 
good portion of otherwise politically indifferent voters by emphasising anti-Roma themes (Karácsony 
and Róna 2010).  
 
Jobbik in contrast focuses its attention on issues of popular interest. Through their internet presence, 
they are able to keep these issues on the agenda. The internet networks of the radical right have thus 
been more effective than those of other parties. Jobbik has a central website with links to numerous 
smaller local sites. This means that local issues easily become public issues, further facilitating 
continued communication between the centre and the local spaces. This is also an interactive internet 
world proffering related discursive topoi rather than a clearly defined ideology. Their contents also 
appear on multiple sites (with videos on youtube, for example), thus providing greater access to a 
wider audience. The creation of this second or alternative public sphere is itself conducive to its 
message that a small minority of liberals, ex-communists, and Jews has the power to impose its view 
on the society. In the name of the nation, the radical right argues, this power must be opposed. 
Alternative knowledge against canonized knowledge is thus fabricated (Barkóczi 2010). 
2. Research focus 
 
Political processes can be understood from both their demand and the supply sides. This is particularly 
true when considering the rise of the far right (Mudde 2007). Jobbik’s successes cannot simply be 
explained by their supporters’ anti-Roma views, that is to say, the demand side. The reactions of other 
political forces and the mediatisation of the radical party also need to be considered in order to 
understand how anti-Roma attitudes have been used to achieve political goals; in other words, the 
supply side must also be investigated. The radical right made anti-Roma themes the centrepiece of its 
political rhetoric; for its part, the mainstream media made sure those themes remained on the agenda. 
Jobbik was thus able to manipulate and control the Roma question and through it the media in a way 
that contributed to its rapid rise.  The party took advantage not only of the ‘opportunity’ offered by the 
demand side – anti-Roma attitudes – but also from the supply side.  
 
There are at least two explanations why the mainstream media are receptive to the issues presented by 
the radical right. First, it has been claimed for a long time by researchers, experts and activists that the 
media representation of the Roma and Roma issues are strongly biased and prejudiced. Editors, 
journalists, and reporters are either not aware that certain media content they produce are stereotyped 
or even racist or they simply hold prejudiced views themselves (Bernáth-Messing 1998; Ligeti 2007; 
Tóth 2011). Second, the mainstream media are unable to handle or contain the radical right. They are 
inexperienced and lacking appropriate skills in this regard. The mainstream media present the radical 
right in three ways. First, they tend to overdramatise both the importance and impact of the radical 
right (this is particularly the case with the more leftist orientated media), second, they tend to 
downplay their significance (this is the case with the rightwing media), and third, while the media 
support extremist views (as can be seen in the extremist media) (Barta 2008).  
 
In our study we are interested in the rise and spread of ‘racist language’ in public debates and the 
media. We take Wodak and Reisigl’s (2001) premise that racism is a political ‘fighting word’ as our 
starting point.  Racism in this view is both a practice and an ideology that manifests itself discursively. 
Ian Law argues that two fundamental discourses, racist and anti-racist ones, are in a struggle with one 
another in the media (Law 2010: 193)  The 1970s and 1980s witnessed the emergence and rise of 
‘coded racism’ (Downing and Husband 2005). Hall (2000) and Van Dijk (1989) observed that this 
coded racism was more dangerous since it was less noticeable and therefore more insidious. In many  
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countries the 1990s brought with it a fashion for ‘breaking taboos’ that had been earlier created by 
anti-racist discourses and forced upon the society. This ‘new realism’ presented itself as revealing the 
‘truth’ about ethnic and racial groups (Prins 2007).  This ‘new realism’ as its proponents would like to 
call it might also be known as the resurfacing of an open racism in public and media discourses.   
 
This spread of racist language and discourse of course requires further analysis. ‘A “discourse” about a 
specific topic can find its starting point within one field of action and proceed through another one. 
Discourses and discourse topics “spread” to different fields and discourses. They cross between fields, 
overlap, refer to each other, or are in some other way sociofuncionally linked with each other’ (Wodak 
and Reisigl 2001: 383). A discourse analytical approach cannot however reveal causality (Downing 
and Husband 2005). Nevertheless, we can make use of quantitative methods through which 
conclusions about agenda setting can be formulated (Protess and McComb 1991).  
 
In our case study we will analyse media representations of two murder cases (with the Roma as the 
perpetrators in the first one (case 1.) and the victims in the second one (case 2.)); we will then 
conclude with a debate on ‘Roma integration and the end of political correctness’ (case 3.) as it 
appeared in left orientated papers. Our main purpose is to show the range of reactions to the radical 
right and how the Roma issue was thematised through engagement with these two murder cases. This 
will shed light on the ways in which radical right discourses spread to mainstream discourses.  
Research design  
In our research we applied the method of discourse analysis. Wodak (Wodak and Meyer 2001; Wodak 
and Reisigl 2001) identifies five different discursive strategies found in discriminatory utterances: (1) 
referential or nomination strategy that serves the purpose of constructing and representing social 
actors as in-groups and out-groups
3
. (2) Predication strategies are characterized by the use of 
“stereotypical, evaluative attributions of negative and positive traits” in the linguistic form of implicit 
or explicit predicates: “labelling social actors in a negative or a positive way, deprecatorily or 
appreciatively” (Wodak and Meyer 2001: 73) (3) Argumentation strategies and fund of topoi4 are used 
to justify positive or negative attributions, and political inclusion or exclusion, discriminatory or 
preferential treatment. (4) Perspectivation, framing or discourse representation is a strategy through 
which speakers express “their involvement in discourse and position their point of view” (Wodak and 
Meyer 2001: 73). (5) Intensifying strategies and mitigating strategies help to “qualify or modify the 
epistemic status of a proposition by intensifying or mitigating the illocutionary force of racist, anti-
Semitic, nationalist, or ethnicist utterances” (Wodak and Reisigl 2001: 386).  
In our study we analysed four Hungarian media sources three of which served as a basis for case 1. 
and case 2., and the fourth for case 3. For the first two cases we included the following media: 
kuruc.info.hu,
5
 one of the most important radical right-wing internet web-sites in Hungary, the left-
wing but mainstream Népszabadság
6
, and the right-wing (also mainstream) Magyar Nemzet.
7
 For our 
                                                     
3
 “This is done via membership categorization devices including references by tropes like biological, naturalizing, and 
depersonalizing metaphors and metonymies as well as by synecdoches” (Wodak and Reisigl 2001: 386). 
4
 “Topoi are the content related-warrants or ‘onclusion rules’ which connect the arguement or arguments with the conclusion, 
the claim. As such, they justify the transition from the arguement or arguments to the conclusion” (Wodak and Meyer 
2001, p. 74.). 
5
 Kuruc.info.hu is the leading ineternet web-site of the radical right. Its editors use pseudonyms and it is operated from an 
American server. It is openly racist against all minorities. The site is constantly in the focus of debates on hate speech and 
efforts have been made to ban it. 
6
 Népszabadság is the largest national daily with left wing orientation. It used to be the Communist Party’s official paper. 
Since 1989 it has enjoyed the the continued support of the Sociality Party.  
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third case we compiled a database by choosing one particular debate published in a weekly political 
and economic magazine, Heti Világ Gazdaság
8
. 
For case 1. and 2. we conducted keyword searches – looking for the name of Olaszliszka and 
Tatárszentgyörgy – in both papers and the website to compile a dataset containing all relevant articles 
published since the incidents occurred. From the dataset we selected opinion articles and looked for 
discursive strategies employed in the articles. For case 3, we used all articles of one particular debate 
launched by the editors of hvg.hu entitled: Why don’t Hungarian Roma integrate?9   
 
3. Analysis of the media representation and the public discourse on two symbolic events: 
Olaszliszka and Tatárszentgyörgy and the ‘Roma integration debate’ 
Case 1. Olaszliszka  
 
In October 2006 a middle aged teacher was driving through a small village in the north of the country 
with his two daughters when he accidentally hit a girl crossing the road. As the man got out of his car 
to help the girl a group of local people including the father of the girl gathered around, concerned for 
the girl’s wellbeing. The driver was brutally attacked, and died on the spot as a result of his injuries. 
His two daughters witnessed their father being killed from where they sat in the car. The attackers 
were Roma. The girl, who had been hit by the car, had not been injured. Within two days, the police 
had arrested the perpetrators.  
 
The government also reacted swiftly by issuing a statement in which it both denounced the murder but 
simultaneously warned that generalising from the incident by blaming the whole Roma community 
should be avoided:  
“The police… will make every effort to find and punish the persecutors. There is no excuse 
for such a murder. It is a crime, a brutal act. However, any kind of generalisation or anti-
Gypsy instigation should be denounced. This would be harmful… to the case and to the 
country. The government believes we should not let anyone lead us into this cul-de-sac. …The 
state should interfere to prevent aggression and prejudice of this kind” (Government 
spokesperson, HVG 18.10.2006). 
 
Despite the government’s warnings the brutal murder captured the attention of the media for weeks. 
The initial shock caused by the incident was further aggravated by the media’s insistence on the ethnic 
origins of the perpetrators, deliberately invoking stereotypes while discussing the details of the case. 
Thus expressions such as ‘wild and barbarian group’, ‘blind family attachment’, ‘inclination to 
vigilantism’, ‘uncontrolled aggression’, ‘different norms of behaviour from that of the majority’, to 
name but a few were found throughout the media (Pócsik 2007). 
  
In what follows we argue that this public discourse eventually followed two different trajectories. On 
the one hand, one discourse continued to rely on stereotyped representation of the event and the Roma, 
while a second discourse attempted to use a more politically correct approach to framing the event.  
(Contd.)                                                                  
7
 Magyar Nemzet was founded in 1938 and has always been a conservative paper. After 1989, the newspaper emerged as an 
independent and moderate/conservative paper. In 2000 the paper was merged with a more extremist right wing paper. 
Although it is still considered mainstream, since the merger it has adapted a rather radical voice.  
8
 www.hvg.hu: According to the self defintion of the magazine, HVG is a liberal minded, economic-political weekly not 
linked to any political parities. It publiches articles regardless of political party interests.   
9
 http://hvg.hu/velemeny/20091014_roma_cigany_integracio. The debate was published between October and November 
2009.  
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This second, politically correct variant proved weak in the face of the more radical and stereotypical 
representations found elsewhere.  It was thus the stereotypical discourses that soon began dominating 
the media on all sides of the political spectrum. This emboldened the radical right, allowing them to 
take advantage of the situation by labelling the case a typical manifestation of ‘Gypsy crime’. The 
term in Jobbik’s formulation:  
“does not mean that all Gypsies are criminals. This is not the collective stigmatization of 
Gypsies, neither is it racism, since the term refers not to a genetic determination but socio-
cultural background. This is a term used in criminology to describe certain types of crimes 
specific to this minority (usury, stabbing, mob fighting, iron theft) which require special 
treatment. (…) Jobbik made a historic breakthrough by openly saying what everybody knows 
but tries to hide in the name of political correctness: Gypsy crime exists, moreover, it 
proliferates in Hungary” (Election program of Jobbik, 2010). 
 
In the following paragraphs we will examine how Olaszliszka was discursively dealt with on the most 
important radical right web-site, kuruc.info.hu.  Next, we will consider how the two major daily 
newspapers, the right wing Magyar Nemzet and the left wing Népszabadság reported these events, 
revealing the differences between these various media representations to see to how they contributed 
to the radicalisation of the discourse.  
Kuruc.info.hu  
 
The main discursive strategy of kuruc.info.hu was the use of the topos, ‘Gypsy crime’:  
“The Gypsy mob lynched a teacher to death. Another victim of Gypsy terrorism: It is a shame 
that the … Gypsies, after having fucked the possibility for peaceful coexistence, are still free 
and are attacking us. Us, peaceful Hungarians. They forget to mention that Olaszliszka was 
not a unique case. In the last sixteen years Gypsy mobs have been attacking peaceful 
Hungarian citizens in more and more aggressive ways. Gypsy leaders don’t want to stop this” 
(http://kuruc.info/r/2/6487/).   
 
For kuruc.info.hu, Gypsy crime is a fact: deficient Roma attributes explain their criminal behaviour, 
and this in turn justifies their continued exclusion. The genetic explanation for ‘Gypsy crime’ is taken 
for granted as can be seen in the headings used on the website: ‘Gene cemetery’ marks the 
phenomenon of biological racism and the idea of inferior race as used in the far-right discourse. Anti-
Semitism is also present on kuruc.info.hu. Besides ‘Gypsy crime’, the site presents other articles under 
the heading ‘Jewish crime’. The Roma and Jews are thus both genetic groups, having certain specific 
and deterministic biological characteristics that inspire them to engage in certain types of criminal 
activities. 
 
Other discursive strategies included nomination and predication. The out-group, the Roma were 
attributed negative traits by using the expression ‘Gypsy mob’. Other out-groups, including those that 
represent and stand up for Roma, included human rights activists and Roma leaders.  The in-group, in 
contrast, the Hungarians, are the opposite: they are peaceful. Presenting Hungarians (the majority) as 
victims is actually one of the main strategies of kuruc.info.hu when expressing their views on the 
Roma. There is a heading ‘Anti-Hungarianism’, that sums up the essence of the extremist 
understanding of intergroup relations: on the one side can be found ‘them’, the genetic waste, the 
criminals, and on the other side are ‘us’, the ‘Hungarians’, who are threatened and, as the case of 
Olaszliszka proves, attacked and killed by ‘them’.  
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Magyar Nemzet  
 
In Magyar Nemzet, we find evidence of the same main discursive strategy favoured on kuruc.info.hu: 
the characterisation of the murder as an example of ‘Gypsy crime’. Here we examine how this topos is 
constructed by Magyar Nemzet and the ways it differs from kuruc.info.hu’s uses of it. What we 
discovered is a direct link between the radical right website, the radical party and Magyar Nemzet.  
Indeed, Magyar Nemzet’s initial reporting on the Olaszliszka case was as a mouthpiece for Jobbik:  
“Jobbik was appalled to learn that a father who hit a Roma child with his car was beaten to 
death in Olaszliszka in front of the eyes of his two children. The incident is not unprecedented 
since in the previous years the number of brutal crimes committed by Gypsies has radically 
increased. The media and the authorities in the name of positive discrimination did not 
mention the ethnic background of the perpetrators” (http://mno.hu/migr/jobbik-olaszliszka-
utan-uj-romapolitika-kell-473660, 16.10.2006). 
 
The paper then quoted the Jobbik’s official statement in response to the event:  
“Jobbik demands the immediate change of laws infringing legal equality by providing an 
unduly favourable situation for the Gypsy ethnic group. A radically new and systematically 
altered Roma politics has to be implemented. (…) One of the essential elements of this 
programme would be the implementation of crisis management based on the recognition of the 
existence of Gypsy crime. The majority society must be informed about Roma issues without 
hiding facts and the Gypsy society must be made to realise that in Hungary they also have to 
obey the laws” (http://mno.hu/migr/jobbik-olaszliszka-utan-uj-romapolitika-kell-473660, 
16.10.2006) 
 
Magyar Nemzet thus declared its ideological stance in that matter by aligning itself with Jobbik. The 
next day a long opinion article entitled ‘Gypsyliszka’ appeared in the newspaper.  
“The perpetrators were Gypsies. Several dozens. Several dozens of lynching people.’ ‘Now 
what is to come is that the unbearably abject “human rights defenders” will appear in the 
media with tears in their eyes. The script is the following: after a couple of days an article will 
be published that the slaughtered teacher was racist. Then it will be succeeded by a report 
from the village that reveals that poor Gypsy kids are always run over by cars, and so therefore 
the life of poor Gypsies in Olaszliszka is a never ending dread. The third report on Olaszliszka 
will disclose that racism rages in the village and poor defenceless Gypsies are exposed to 
constant bullying. It is no wonder that they went wild. (…) Anyone hitting a Gypsy child in 
this country with his car should accelerate (…) and only stop at the next police station. (Since 
if we run over a child we stop, we should do something, so it is better to get hold of a gun 
before hitting the road). (…) We know very well that the state will not guarantee our safety. 
Similarly we cannot hope that the state will compensate us for our injuries. (…) We should 
shout: the majority society does not have to tolerate this. We are self-destructive fools if we 
tolerate this. (…) Zero tolerance. This should be the new catchword. Nobody will defend our 
rights. We can depend only on ourselves.” (http://mno.hu/velemeny/ciganyliszka-473730, MN 
17.10.2006)  
 
The main goal of the article and others like it is to break the taboo of referring to the ethnic 
background of the perpetrators
10. In this way the ‘Gypsy crime’ topos features differently than the way 
it was used on kuruc.info.hu. There, ‘Gypsy crime’ is an expression that is taken for granted; there is 
thus no need to break any taboos.  
 
The out-groups (nomination) are similar to those used by kuruc.info.hu: the Roma and the civil rights 
activists; the in-group is again the majority society (Hungarians). When labelling the groups 
                                                     
10
 In Hungary the “Gypsy origin” of offenders were recorded between the period of 1971 and 1989. Today, the 1992 data 
protection law prohibits such data collection. http://www.okri.hu/content/blogcategory/26/52/ 
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(predication), Magyar Nemzet employs very similar strategies: on the one hand, the majority society is 
again represented as victim of the minority:  
 
“We are self-destructive fools if we tolerate this’, while on the other hand, we have the 
‘unbearably abject human rights activists’ and the innately brutal and aggressive Roma: ‘They 
suckle criminality from their mothers’ milk and as soon as they become a majority 
somewhere, they destroy everything. They abuse and hate Hungarians although they have 
never received as much money from the state then nowadays” (http://mno.hu/migr/hvghu-
kontra-magyar-nemzet-382895).  
 
This latter quote also reveals Magyar Nemzet’s biological understanding of the Roma: ‘they suckle 
criminality from their mothers’ milk.’ 
Népszabadság 
 
Népszabadság used different discursive strategies when reporting on Olaszliszka. The topos ‘Gypsy 
crime’ is used in a negation, claiming that no such phenomenon exists by citing Roma leaders: ‘This is 
not a Gypsy issue, but a criminal case.’ (http://nol.hu/archivum/archiv-421067) 
 
One of the newspaper’s other strategies is the use of various framings. Articles dealing with the 
desperate situation of the region where the murderous incident took place were published in the weeks 
and months after the murder. Journalists wrote reports and did interviews with people living there, 
including the Roma. One Roma woman from the village complained:  
“This incident is disastrous for us. It is horrible what happened but most people generalise, 
they don’t treat us as individuals. (…) The grandfathers and fathers of the new generation had 
jobs and worked. Now they only can hope for social assistance and public service work.  (…) 
Children growing up in destitution will become desperate themselves” 
(http://nol.hu/archivum/archiv-421353).  
 
This strategy introduces a new perspective, the perspective of the Roma as victims of social 
disadvantages.  
 
The same strategy is discernable when Népszabadság writes about the ‘Roma being afraid of revenge’. 
Jobbik organised demonstrations in the village and concerts in other locations to commemorate the 
murdered teacher. The memorial site erected on the spot of the deadly act and just the village itself 
more generally gradually became a site for pilgrimage for the radical right. In connection to these 
events, Népszabadság published articles denouncing the radical right.  They also reported on how the 
Roma population felt about the presence of these groups in the village:  
“Last autumn the rumours spread among the Gypsy families of Olaszliszka that two thousand 
skinheads were heading to the village from Miskolc. On these occasions, hundreds of people 
fled their homes and found shelter on the other side of the river with their relatives. In the 
meantime in the Roma settlement, windows of several houses were broken and one deserted 
house burnt down. Another scandal broke out after anonymous death threats were delivered to 
many Roma. A political group organised a demonstration in Olaszliszka demanding the 
reinstitution of capital punishment” (http://nol.hu/archivum/archiv-450496, MN 17.06.2007). 
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Case 2. Tatárszentgyörgy  
 
‘Four men, nine cases, six dead’  
(http://nol.hu/kritika/20091004-ciganyvadaszat_magyarorszagon)  
 
A series of murderous attacks against the Roma that began in 2008 were later revealed to be racially 
motivated.
11
 The victims all lived in houses situated on the edges of small villages, and the villages 
were all close to major roads that helped facilitate the gunmen’s escape. The gunmen prepared 
meticulously for their attacks, choosing the village, street and houses carefully. Each attack took place 
in the middle of the night or at dawn; Molotov cocktails provided the necessary light to make the 
targets easier to see. The actual victims, however, were chosen randomly.  This sent the message that 
Roma people do not deserve recognition as individuals, but rather share collective guilt for their 
‘Gypsy crime’. In August 2009 four men were arrested by the police on suspicion of murder. The 
police found neo-Nazi symbols in the suspects’ houses, establishing the racial motivations of the 
crimes. Their trial is ongoing.   
 
The murders in Tatárszentgyörgy of a father and his five year old son marked a turning point not only 
in public discourse but also in how the police and authorities dealt with the cases. It was then that the 
police began to consider possible racial motivations for the attacks. Before, their investigation had 
focused on the Roma as the perpetrators of the crimes on the assumption that the victims had been 
involved in some sort of Roma criminal activity or family revenge.  
 
In our analysis we will look at the discursive representations of the Tatárszentgyörgy murders as they 
appeared on the radical right wing web-site and in Magyar Nemzet and Népszabadság.      
Kuruc.info.hu 
 
Similar to the Olaszliszka case, one of the most common strategies employed by kuruc.info.hu is the 
Tatárszentgyörgy case was nomination whereby the in-group, the majority Hungarians, through a 
process of conversion became the victims. They were the targets of an anti-Hungarian conspiracy: 
“Anti-Hungarianism: The funeral in Tatárszentgyörgy can be turned into an anti-Hungarian 
demonstration” (http://kuruc.info/r/2/36281/). 
 
In other cases we find the ironic use of double conversion, whereby the ‘victims’ (the Hungarians) are  
mockingly recast as murderers:  
“Hungarian humiliation in the Sunday Times. The sinful nation committed a murder against 
poor, honest, hard working Gypsies. (…) A well informed journalist from Vienna wrote that 
since the Cosma murder
12
 the number of attacks against Gypsies has increased. We know that 
we Hungarians shot, stabbed, raped, threatened our dark skinned friends on a daily basis. Not 
the other way around, that’s for certain” (http://kuruc.info/r/20/36261/). 
 
Predication strategy is also used in connection to the murders in the same way as in the Olaszliszka 
case.  Roma and human rights activists are given pejorative, condescending labels:  
                                                     
11
 In August 2008 in the village of Piricse, a Molotov cocktail was thrown at the house of a 64 year old woman who was 
subsequently shot in the leg. In November of the same year in Nagycsécse, a middle aged couiple were killed in a similar 
attack. The following February aMolotov cocktail was thrown again at another house, this time in Tatárszentgyörgy, and 
the fleeing father and his five year old son were shot to death. Two months later in Tiszalök a man leaving his house was 
shot and killed. Finally, in August 2009 in Kisléta a 45 year old woman was killed and her 13 year old daughter injured in 
another gun attack. The perpetrators entered their house and shot them from close range.  
12
 This is a reference to the murder of a famous handball player, Cosma, by Roma perpetatrators in 2009.      
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“The left-lib Kisalföld13 wants people to feel sorry for the Moccas.14 It published a timely and 
juicy Gypsy-pitying article so that our readers can feel even more sorry for the persecuted 
Roma who live in fear.” (http://kuruc.info/r/35/38377/). 
 
The predication strategy does not only evaluate the out-group (Roma) negatively, but the mainstream 
media and press agencies as well. The media are depicted as presenting lies and they are portrayed as 
controlled by Jews:  
“The Hungarian Press Agency lied in connection with the Tatárszentgyörgy case. How many 
times has the Hungarian Talmud Agency
15
 lied to us using our tax proceeds?’ 
(http://kuruc.info/r/35/37430/). Or: ‘The race defender, HVG, lies again about racist attacks. – 
We are used to  HVG, which has an editor- in-chief who is a famous news-faker and which 
used to have a Zionist ex-editor–in-chief, who spread the most brutal Gypsy-coddling, race 
defender propaganda.” (http://kuruc.info/r/35/38081/). 
 
There is a direct link between kuruc.info.hu, Jobbik and Magyar Nemzet. We found Magyar Nemzet 
reports often serving as a positive point of reference points for kuruc.info.hu. For example, 
Kuruc.info.hu referred to Magyar Nemzet articles in which the paper presented local Roma in 
Tatárszentgyörgy (including the victim’s family) as being involved in various criminal activities: “On 
Saturday Magyar Nemzet published a well written piece on the Tatárszentgyörgy murder” 
(http://kuruc.info/r/35/38797/). 
Magyar Nemzet  
 
In the two mainstream papers, the murder was framed as one of two possible but competing 
interpretations, either ‘a racial hate crime or a non-racial hate crime’.  The major strategy found in 
Magyar Nemzet, was the use of the topos ‘not a hate crime’; its aim was to prove that the killing was 
not motivated by racial hatreds:  
“Is it out of the question that racists committed the murder in Tatárszentgyörgy? No, this 
cannot be excluded, but it is the least likely scenario. Racist attacks everywhere in the world 
are committed by terrorists who are proud of their deeds and they want their victims to be 
afraid of them. They make their voice heard somehow, they want publicity” (MN 25.04.2009).  
 
This perspective was frequently repeated not only by journalists writing for the paper but also by 
different experts reported in the paper, thus giving the interpretation even greater importance and 
legitimacy.  
 
The topos, ‘not a hate crime’, is constructed with the other topos, ‘Gypsy crime’, that we saw earlier in 
the case of Olaszliszka.  Both topoi were frequently employed by Magyar Nemzet. The ‘not a hate 
crime’ strategy depicted other interpretations ‘conjecture’, motivated by ‘revenge’ or ‘usury’. 
Conventional wisdom in Hungary holds that these types of crimes are committed mainly by Roma. 
The implication is that the murderer must have also been Roma:  
“In Tatárszentgyörgy the perpetrator was most likely Gypsy. I spent a couple of weeks in the 
village and I know that the relatives of the victim had tense relationships with Gypsy criminals 
who have guns” (MN 18.06.2009). 
 
                                                     
13
 Kislaföld is a regional newspaper.  
14
 Mocca is a racialised term for Roma. 
15
 ‘Hungarian Press Agency’ translates as ‘Magyar Távirati Iroda’, abbreviated as MTA, in Hungarian. Kuruc.info.hu 
replaces ‘Távirati’ (Press) with ‘Talmud’.  
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The aim of Magyar Nemzet was to present various types of evidence suggesting that all the Roma in 
Tatárszentgyörgy, including the murdered man, were criminals.  In this way, Magyar Nemzet’s 
coverage of the Tatárszentgyörgy murders harkened back to the ‘Gypsy crime’ topos deployed in the 
Olaszliszka case:  
“Without any reason, the Roma attacked a young man in Tatárszetgyörgy. The instigators of 
the fight were all relatives of Csorba Róbert, the murdered man. (…) The motivation 
according to the attacked man was that they had drunk too much” (MN 23.05.2009). 
 
Magyar Nemzet also posited that the Roma could also be guilty of committing racial hate crimes. This 
could nevertheless be interpreted as part of the ‘not a hate crime topos’. By turning the hate crime 
interpretation back on the Roma, the ‘Gypsy crime’ interpretation gains further credibility.  
“I feel there is a contradiction here. While in case of the Olaszliszka murder where all relevant 
details are known, we are not supposed to talk about racist emotions or motivations in the 
name of political correctness. In the case of the Tatárszentgyörgy murder, as soon as we learnt 
about the ethnic origins of the victims, Roma rights activists immediately label the killing as 
racial hate crime” (MN 28.03.2009).  
 
The nomination strategy employed in the Tatárszentgyörgy case was used mainly to distinguish 
between the human rights activists and left-liberals on the one hand and majority Hungarians on the 
other. The most important ‘other’ is thus the liberal left, advocating human rights and defending the 
rights of the Roma minority. One of the accusations made against left-liberals is that they demand that 
the murders in Tatárszentgyörgy and elsewhere be investigated as racial hate crime, but without, as 
Magyar Nemzet argues, having any proof. Moreover, the same left liberals are also instigating hatred 
against the Hungarian majority by labelling them racist:  
“Iványi Gábor16 instigates hatred – (Talking at the funeral of the victims): He accused the non-
Roma population of being accomplices to the murderers even though we don’t know anything 
about the motivation or skin colour of these cold-blooded perpetrators. (…) In his prayer, he 
expressed the idea of collective sin: “Forgive us for the hate speech that we cannot stop. 
Forgive us for the schools where Gypsies cannot enter. We threaten you and we do not stop 
the vicious guards that march all over the country”(MN 05.03.2009).  
 
This can be understood as a predication strategy whereby the pejoratively labelled minister is accused 
of committing the same negative racist deeds that he claims to be criticising. Magyar Nemzet used the 
same strategy while claiming that the ‘racist card’ is a political instrument of the left-liberals. The left-
liberals accused the right of being racist to deter people from supporting to the ‘racist right’:  
“According to the leftist liberal elite the right wing is instigating hatred against the minorities 
which has resulted in the serial murders of Gypsies. Tatárszentgyörgy is a metaphor, a 
political symbol: it means that it is not possible to support the right because it is racist” (MN 
25.04.2009). 
 
Predication strategies manifest themselves in Magyar Nemzet as conspiracy theories:  
“A radical right, racist, ideologically motivated group of serial-murderers is a tempting idea, 
but it’s very unlikely. What is most likely is that we are facing a politically motivated 
murder…. What is important is not the murder itself but the social, political and economic 
impact the killings have on society. This was the aim of those who committed the murder, and 
they found the right tools and the right plotline” (MN 08.08.2009).  
 
The political ‘other’ here is marked as a negative figure, someone capable of heartlessly committing 
murder to achieve political goals.   
 
 
                                                     
16
 Iványi Gábor is a well-know methodist minister and an outspoken defender of the Roma minority.  
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In August of 2009, four men were arrested and charged with the Tatárszentgyörgy murders. After they 
were taken into custody it was announced that the suspects had all possessed neo-Nazi paraphernalia 
and had also expressed openly radical and racist views. From that point forward, Magyar Nemzet 
stopped reporting on the murders. The topic only resurfaced in the pages of Magyar Nemzet once the 
trial began a couple of months later. The tone and language of the articles at that stage became mostly 
matter of fact.   
Népszabadság  
 
The discursive strategies found in Népszabadság were the opposite to those used by Magyar Nemzet.  
Népszabadság deployed the ‘hate crime’ topos as its main discursive strategy. Expert opinions were 
published in the newspaper that did not rule out the possibility of a racially motivated hate crime: ‘ 
“It is possible that the family in Tatárszentgyörgy was attacked as a result of a previous 
conflict, but it is also possible that racism was behind the killing. According to Németh [the 
chief police investigator], the murderers believed that they were omnipotent and that they 
knew the truth about everything. It is likely that they have families and jobs and that they are 
not from underground criminal groups” (NSZ 23.02.2009).  
 
At the same time the police were criticised for not taking this interpretation seriously in their 
investigation:  
“Until the murders in Tatárszentgyörgy, the police had not taken attacks on the Roma very 
seriously. Since then they have changed their tactics. In 2008 when the first Molotov-cocktail 
and other attempted murders occurred the police immediately ruled out the possibility of the 
crimes being ethnically motivated and investigated instead the lives of the victims as if they 
had somehow deserved their fate. They do not dare commit the same mistakes in 
Tatárszentgyörgy” (NSZ 07.08.2009). 
 
Népszabadság also raised an issue that had not been addressed in other media. In their reporting, 
Népszabadság raised the possibility that the Hungarian Guard might somehow be implicated in the 
murders. Indeed, a direct link was posited between the Hungarian Guard’s intimidating and 
provocative marches and the murders that followed:  
“The rotten fruit of the Hungarian Guard planted in December 2007 an accompanied by the 
applause of the cheering villagers has now ripened”, said Sanyika, a sixty year old Gypsy man 
in a pub in Tatárszentgyörgy. “They were shouting that Hungarians should come with us! And 
we were watching them, horrified while they marched through the main street. Tell me, aren’t 
we Hungarians?” (NSZ 23.02.2009). 
 
“According to a local woman, after the Hungarian Guard marched through the village in 
December 2007, the atmosphere changed in Tatárszentgyörgy. “They looked at us in the 
supermarket as if we were criminals”, she said” (NSZ 02.03.2009). 
 
As part of a predication strategy, the paper depicted the rightwing in a negative light and insinuated 
that the rightwing media and assorted institutions were not doing their job responsibly (insofar as they 
weren’t taking the possibility of a hate crime seriously). Népszabadság was critical of politicians of all 
persuasions, including a circle of the leftwing intellectuals, for using racist discourses:  
“In Kisléta the rightwing journalist was very provocative and aggressive toward the family 
shocked by the murder. Then he managed to write about the uncivilized and barbaric Gypsies 
in a witty way. Part of the media lacks self-control and instigates hatred that becomes even 
more plausible in periods like we’re experiencing now. This is part of our media reality. While 
the rightwing deliberately borrows the rhetoric of the far-right, a segment of the leftist liberal 
side does the same thing more indirectly but while posing as the brave opponent of political 
correctness, thus endorsing the prejudicial beliefs of the wider public” (NSZ 07.08.2009). 
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The same strategy was used to portray the victim and his family as poor but peaceful and good:  
“The mayor of Tatárszentgyörgy reported that both the murdered man and his father worked 
regularly. They supported their families by relying on odd jobs. From the spring till the end of 
the autumn they worked in construction in the capital. (…) They received housing aid as do all 
poor families in the village. But they did not always beg for aid” (NSZ 26.02.2009).  
 
Roma, the victims, are characterised in a positive light by the paper. Like in the Olaszliszka case, the 
framing strategy used by Népszabadság for the Tatárszentgyörgy murders tended to call for 
compassion for the victims whilst stressing its concern for the Roma community given the possibility 
of future attacks.  The state in the view of Népszabadság was neglecting the Roma:  
“Whatever the intentions of the Gypsy hating perpetrators, today several thousand people live 
their lives in fear. (…) The state does not feel any obligation to help the victims to get on with 
their lives or to overcome the trauma [of the murders], unlike in the United States where 
special aid workers are sent to help after murders in schools” (NSZ 07.08.2009). 
 
Case 3. The Roma integration debate   
Olaszliszka as a symbol  
 
Now we turn to the ‘Roma integration debate’ that occurred in the mainstream, leftist oriented 
newspapers and weekly magazines between mainly conservative but also some leftist-liberal 
intellectuals. This case reveals how taboos associated with political correctness were deliberately 
challenged and ultimately discarded. The debate was spurred by the incidents discussed in the 
previous pages (mainly Olaszliszka). A content analysis of these debates revealed the incident 
occupied an important place in the two major mainstream newspapers for an initial six-months (the 
sensational period) and remained important for a long period thereafter (Vörös 2009). It was also 
discovered that Olaszliszka had increasingly been transformed into a reference point for the wider 
debate, particularly for the rightwing conservative paper. Olaszliszka was referred to in relation to 
other issues, but the incident itself and the events directly linked to it received little attention, implying 
that Olaszliszka had achieved the status of a symbol (Vörös 2009). Olaszliszka did indeed leave its 
imprint on the Hungarian collective consciousness through the various representations found in the 
media. However, as we have seen, the leftwing paper had attempted to establish a competing frame of 
interpretation, using  different  discourses,  while the rightwing paper did not shy away from 
embracing overtly racist discourses that were basically indistinguishable to those used by the radical 
right on its web-site. Thus, as Olaszliszka became a symbol, a referential issue, on the one hand, its 
representations did continue to vary to a large extent on the other hand, at least in the two mainstream 
newspapers.  
  
What then accounts for the radicalisation of these public discourses? How could Olaszliszka and the 
meanings attached to it (‘Gypsy crime’, ‘born criminals’, ‘Gypsies terrorising the majority’, etc) 
become so widely accepted?
17
 Here we have to refer back to Jobbik’s definition of ‘Gypsy crime’ in 
their 2010 election programme. They described their return to a rhetoric of ‘Gypsy crime’ as a historic 
breakthrough because in their view the phenomenon existed but had been stifled by politically 
correctness. Jobbik’s claims were prophetic: ultimately a shift occurred in mainstream discourse as 
well.  It began with prejudiced talk about ‘being Gypsies’ (‘cigányozás’), becoming more widespread, 
penetrating public and everyday talk as well: ‘It [‘cigányzás’] promises to solve existing problems. It 
provides momentous pleasure in breaking taboos and offers the illusion of a treacherous remedy. If the  
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 About four fifths of the population believes that Roma commit crimes more often than the non-Roma, and about two thirds 
agrees that Gypsies have crime in their blood (Gimes-Juhász-Kiss-Krekó 2009. p. 68). 
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Gypsy is the cause of almost all of our problems, it is our duty to say openly this heretofore repressed 
truth about Gypsy crime in order that we may approach the solution. Covering up the problem makes 
the situation worse; such is the logic’ (Zádori 2010). 
 
One of the most important channels for unleashing racist language similar to or identical with that 
used by the radical right was the rightwing paper, Magyar Nemzet. The newspaper’s influence would 
have still likely been limited however had it acted alone in this regard.  But it didn’t.  It was joined by 
commercial TV channels, and to some extent even the public service media as well when discussing 
‘Gypsy issues’ (Pócsik 2007). In addition, many leftist papers and weekly magazines (Népszabadság, 
Figyelő, HVG) launched debates on questions of ‘Gypsy integration’ where an important trend began 
to develop. Intellectuals with both left and conservative world views
18
 participated in the debates and 
although their voices were (mainly) moderate, they nevertheless created a new discourse that was not 
openly but still inherently racist. In the following paragraphs we will present some of the most typical 
discursive strategies that emerged in and through these debates.  
Down with political correctness!   
 
The ‘Roma integration debate’ involving various intellectuals of moderate political background (both 
conservative and leftwing) displayed two main discursive topoi: the ‘end of political correctness’ and 
the ‘peculiar Roma civilisation/culture’.  
 
The ‘end of political correctness’ topos was constructed by claiming that political correctness was a 
mistaken approach and it is time to move beyond it in order to be able to talk about real problems:  
“From the very beginning, intellectuals acting in the name of “political correctness” tried to 
suppress debate about real problems. With the anti-liberal revolution there’s no longer any 
obstacle getting in the way the Gypsy question for the social and political centre” 
(Németh: http://hvg.hu/velemeny/20091029_ciganyvita_felzarkozas_integracio_akadaly). 
 
“PC is gone with the wind. This is not a big loss. Finally we can say what we want and it is not 
hate speech” 
(Póczik: http://img8.hvg.hu/velemeny/20091106_poczik_ciganysag_szegenyseg/2). 
 
“The editor of HVG has launched a more democratic debate than ever before on Roma 
questions. Most of the authors address the question very honestly, they voice opinions, while 
holding the extreme right at bay, that could not have been said in the mainstream media 
earlier. Not because they were so horrible but because they did not use the expected 
phraseology”  
(Novák: http://hvg.hu/velemeny/20091102_cigany_roma_vita). 
 
“In the last twenty years, we middle class Hungarians thought that it was better to look away 
and hide our incapacity behind political correctness” 
(Babarczy: http://hvg.hu/velemeny/20091018_roma_cigany_felzarkozas_babarczy). 
 
Declaring the end of political correctness is not unique to Hungarian politics. This has been termed the 
emergent ‘new realism’ (Prins 2007), a phenomenon occurring in a number of Western democratic 
(and multicultural) societies especially since the 1990s. Prins describes this ‘new realism’ as a 
powerful discourse that claims to face facts and speak frankly about the truth that had been theretofore 
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 Some of the authors who were regular contributors to Magyar Nemzetcan still be identified as moderate conservatives. But 
although they were published in leftwing papers, in most of the cases no real counterarguments were published that 
challenged them. Thus, the debates presented the dominant arguments of these moderate contributors without any other 
perspectives.  
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covered up by leftist censorship. In this sense it represents the vox populi, expressing their anxieties as 
well.
19
 In Hungary, left-liberals are portrayed as the main proponents of political correctness and it’s 
their dominance in this regard that has to be challenged. From the new realism perspective, these left 
liberals have been suppressing the truth for too long, forcing an artificial language upon the people.    
 
This new realism topos is used together with a predication strategy that constructs the left liberals as 
the out-group in conjunction with social scientists and the middle class. Both the validity and 
usefulness of the so-called pseudo-scientific language of political correctness is questioned, and the 
ways in which the question of Roma integration is handled by social scientists is challenged. These 
challenges assume various forms: ‘the Roma question has been over-researched’, ‘the Roma question 
is researched in the wrong way’, and ‘there are very few genuine results coming out of research on the 
Roma.  
 
László Sólyom, then president of Hungary (2005-2010), was unsparing in his criticism of academics 
who, whilst perhaps well intentioned, were hamstrung by their supposed insistence on political 
correctness.   
“This topic is over-researched. I have been to a Roma settlement which has been invaded by 
sociologists every year for ten years.(…) Their meticulous diagnoses are inconsistent with 
their proposed remedies: more education, more jobs, less residential segregation, more Roma 
intellectuals. To be sure, these general statements are politically correct. But digging deeper 
and asking uncomfortable questions puts them at risk of ideologically motivated attacks, be it 
about crimes, school segregation, social benefits, corruption, or what we might expect from 
people living in destitution and trying only to survive. (…) It turns out that avoiding talking 
about these problems has serious consequences, such as the rise of the radicals”  
(Sólyom: http://www.solyomlaszlo.hu/beszedek20091013_konferencia.html). 
 
Many others shared similar views. Some claimed that the problem was not that the Roma question had 
been over-researched, but that it had been researched in the wrong ways, producing few useable 
results:  
“Both the research questions and the results are often based on ideological preconceptions. In 
fact, we know very little about Gypsies” 
(Németh: http://hvg.hu/velemeny/20091029_ciganyvita_felzarkozas_integracio_akadaly).   
 
“It seems to me we know very little about European Gypsies even though lots of money has 
been spent on researching them. We have very few tangible results” 
(Pelle: http://hvg.hu/velemeny/20091102_cigany_roma_vita).   
 
And President Sólyom again:     
“I would like to see more facts… and real knowledge about the Gypsies themselves”  
(Sólyom: http://nol.hu/archivum/lap-20090228-20090228-34). 
 
The other topos favoured in the debate was that the Roma had a ‘peculiar civilization’. Here again 
President Sólyom’s early interventions helped shaped the debate and became an important point of 
reference as the debate continued. In his comments, Sólyom referred positively to a book on the topic 
that had been written by a Roma author:  
“I would like to draw attention to a book called “Gypsy Street” written by Romano Rácz 
Sándor. (…) The author wrote a biography interspersed with long passages in italics on the 
Gypsy lifestyle, their way of thinking, their customs, and the organisation of their society”  
(http://nol.hu/archivum/lap-20090228-20090228-34). 
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 In the Netherlands,’new realism’ and its more radical version, ’hyper-realism’, has both national (being Dutch means being 
frank) and gendered dimensions (Muslim women are oppressed) dimensions.   
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The author of the book, Romano Rácz, defined ‘Roma culture’ thusly:  
“The Roma constitute ‘not only a distinct ethnic group, but also a peculiar and particular 
civilisation that evolved during the long centuries of nomadism; this is a culture of “deliberate 
outsiders”. This culture included a very thrifty life style that provided very low and modest 
living conditions that would have been unimaginable for the majority society. At the same 
time, it also offered security for the community, united as they were in poverty by solidarity” 
(Romano Rácz: http://hvg.hu/velemeny/20091014_roma_cigany_integracio). 
 
Romano Rácz constructs a Roma identity that is based on essentialist understandings of his own 
culture.  This concept proves useful to others in the debate since it fits well the notion that certain 
features of Roma culture are the main obstacle to their integration. Thus various interpretations of this 
new concept of their ‘peculiar civilization’ were readily related to the question of Roma integration. 
The arguments that relied on Romano’s representation of these cultural (civilisational) differences 
concluded that because of their long history as an outsider, the integration of the Roma was not 
possible for at least two reasons. First, the Roma do not want to integrate (which itself derives from 
their civilisational/cultural differences): there is an implication that  
“perhaps the Gypsies of Hungary do not even want to integrate. This suggestion is an 
unforgivable offence in the eyes of the Rózsadomb crowd,
20
 even though the author of the 
book, Romano Rácz, can hardly be accused of Gypsy racism” 
(Németh: http://hvg.hu/velemeny/20091029_ciganyvita_felzarkozas_integracio_akadaly).  
 
Second, whether or not the Roma want to integrate, they cannot be integrated:  
“The author [Romano Rácz] suggests that Gypsies migrating into Europe need a longer period 
of time to integrate, but that ultimately this process can be successful. In fact, however, 
nowhere in Europe have Gypsies managed to integrate even if individual members of the 
community have achieved success in certain areas”  
(Pelle: http://hvg.hu/velemeny/20091102_cigany_roma_vita). 
 
Roma culture is presented as having two features that explain the Roma’s lack of integration. The first 
is that it is pre-modern and the second is its desire for self-exclusion. This pre-modern Roma culture 
hinders integration:  
“Gypsies are pre-modern. Their outsiderness is not only one of the manifestations of their pre-
modernity, but also an effective barrier that is artificially constructed to prevent their 
modernisation” 
(Németh: http://hvg.hu/velemeny/20091029_ciganyvita_felzarkozas_integracio_akadaly).   
 
The same can be said for the Roma’s supposed tendency toward self-exclusion:  
“If their culture is the culture of outsiders, then their exclusion is their own choice”  
(Németh: http://hvg.hu/velemeny/20091029_ciganyvita_felzarkozas_integracio_akadaly). 
 
“We know form Romano’s book (…) that Gypsies live in much more isolation than we might 
have thought. Conventional wisdom  holds that the Roma are isolated in their world because 
of prejudices against them, but the truth is that they isolate themselves, integrating only if a 
need emerges. They never wanted to be successful in the majority society, they always wanted 
to lead a nomadic life outside of this society. (…) By now they have become sedentary but 
some of them still live according to nomadic moral code. If someone from their group suffers 
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 Rózsadomb is one of the wealthiest neighbourhoods in the Budapest. In the debate,“Rózsadomb people’ refers to 
researchers (sociologists, anthropologists, etc.) and civil rights activists who speak and write about the Roma using a 
politically corrrect language from the comfort of their homes,  thus concealing the ‘real’ problems. Critics hold that they 
are isolated from reality and do not appreciate the real problems. The term is heavily leaden with negative 
judgment,suggesting a strong negative stereotype.  
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real or imagined harm, they defend them by the excessive use of collective vigilantism, as was 
the case in Olaszliszka” (Stadler: http://hvg.hu/velemeny/20091109_cigany_roma_integracio). 
 
The validity and strength of these arguments are of course justified by the fact that the author of the 
book is Roma. This, coupled with the book and author’s endorsement from the President of Hungary, 
can be seen throughout the entire debate.  For example,  
“Romano Rácz has helped us immensely to understand this civilisation and culture that is far 
beyond ethnicity. His work marks a new era” 
(Stadler: http://hvg.hu/velemeny/20091109_cigany_roma_integracio). 
 
This debate in the mainstream, moderate, and even leftist oriented media featured a new discourse on 
the Roma that gave increasing legitimacy to the idea that Roma culture is directly derived from 
nomadism. The Roma’s intentional self-exclusion is consequently regarded as a determining feature of 
the Roma, reinforcing widespread stereotypes that the Roma still want to be outsiders because it is 
their culture’s essence not to want to integrate. 
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4. Conclusions  
 
Our analysis of the two murders and the more general ‘Roma integration’ debate that followed reveals 
differences and similarities in discursive strategies used in the media. We distinguished four topoi in 
our three cases: ‘Gypsy crime’, ‘hate crime’, ‘the end of political correctness’ and ‘the peculiar Roma 
civilisation’. We examined how each of these topoi were used in the different media. Our first 
important finding regards the topos of ‘Gypsy crime’. Kuruc.info.hu used it differently from Magyar 
Nemzet. While Magyar Nemzet considered it important to write openly about ‘Gypsy crime’ in order 
to break the taboo of not talking about it, kuruc.info.hu treated ‘Gypsy crime’ as self-evident and 
therefore not requiring further elaboration or justification. In the integration debate we found a similar 
strategy: the ‘end of political correctness’ topos is used to break the taboo of not talking about the 
truth, the real nature of ‘Gypsy difference’. There is, however, an important feature that differentiates 
that understanding of difference. Kuruc.info.hu and Magyar Nemzet invoked biological and genetic 
differences, whereas in the integration debate they referred to Roma differences as cultural 
differences.  
 
Our analysis of the predication strategies revealed that the left-liberals, the liberal media, and civil 
rights activists were the most common ‘others’ for both kuruc.info.hu Magyar Nemzet. At the same 
time, the Roma were also othered by kuruc.info.hu and Magyar Nemzet. The ‘Roma’ indeed are the 
‘other’ who are not assimilable because of the stereotypical characteristics ascribed to them, not all of 
which were negative. An important and new ‘other’ in the integration debate were the social scientists 
who were responsible for conspiring with the liberals to hide the truth, thus creating an atmosphere of 
suppression. In fact, they become the most important ‘other’ in the debate. In Népszabadság it’s the 
Hungarian Guard, the rightwing media and the institutions responsible for not putting an end to 
discrimination that are evaluated negatively.  
 
Besides these argumentation (topoi) and predication strategies, Népszabadság also employed a 
framing strategy by giving voice to the Roma. This is almost the only example of Roma participating 
in the debate. Another example is in the integration debate, but here the Roma voice is used to justify 
the positions of the non-Roma.   
 
Victims feature in all the debates (except the integration debate), but the victims change with each 
case. For kuruc.info.hu and Magyar Nemzet the Hungarians are the victims whereas for Népszabadság 
it’s the Roma.  
 
Finally, we consider how these discourses relate to our non-tolerace–tolerance–acceptance model. We 
have argued that both kuruc.info.hu and Magyar Nemzet displayed intolerant discursive strategies that 
invoked the putative biological differences of the Roma. The Roma are not deserving of toleration 
given their genetically innate inclination to crime. Népszabadság in contrast used discursive strategies 
that emphasised tolerance through a respect of basic human rights and non-discrimination. In the 
integration debate we found that the ‘end of political correctness’ and ‘peculiar Roma culture’ topoi 
were used to stress the cultural distinctiveness of the Roma (not in genetic but cultural terms). The 
recognition of this distinctiveness, however, does not point to the integration of the Roma but on the 
contrary, to their continued exclusion, as was the case with kuruc.info.hu and Magyar Nemzet as well. 
The main element of the Roma’s distinctiveness is their deliberate exclusion.  
 
These findings point to a growing tendency of non-tolerant public discourse in Hungary that spread to 
almost all corners of the political spectrum. There are several political and social processes that 
contribute to this trend of non-toleration. First, the rise of radical racist discourses which has 
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accompanied the political successes of the radical right wing party, Jobbik, has set the political and 
media agenda by thematising the ‘Roma question’.  
 
Second, non-radical political and public figures from both the left and right have responded to this 
thematisation of the ‘Roma question’ in a way that has not excluded non-tolerant racist discourses. 
Indeed, they have often been complicit in legitimating non-tolerant discourses. By acting as partners in 
‘breaking taboos’, they have simultaneously been breaking with the tolerant language that supposedly 
accompanied those taboos. 
 
Third, in the current non-tolerant climate, accepting the (cultural) difference of other ethnic groups has 
become impossible. ‘Roma cultural difference’ instead was ‘accepted’, though in a somewhat 
ambiguous way: its existence was acknowledged, but as grounds for deliberate exclusion. This is 
similar to what we witnessed in France in the 1970s when the new right misappropriated the slogan of 
the left, ‘le droit à la différence’ for their own purposes, claiming that immigrants have the right to 
difference because their culture is so different from French culture that integration is not a possibility. 
Similarly, in the UK, cultural racists have claimed that other (immigrant) cultures cannot be 
integrated. 
 
Finally, in Hungary as in some other post-socialist countries, non-tolerance has troublingly become a 
rally cry of a good number of political and public actors, often irrespective of political affiliation. State 
institutions, political parties and the media have joined forces to fuel suspicion of Roma difference, be 
it biological or cultural. As a result, tolerance as a value and discourse has suffered, embraced by only 
a handful of actors increasingly marginal to the political mainstream.  
 
Hungary is thus a paradox. It recognises the Roma as culturally distinct; indeed, it reifies and 
essentialises their cultural distinctiveness. But this recognition is not based on respect, as we see in the 
ACCEPT framework.  Rather, it is based on racism:  the Roma are not just culturally distinct, they are 
culturally inferior, and that cultural inferiority prevents their full incorporation into Hungarian society.  
This is intolerance, feebly masked as cultural recognition. This intolerance may have the radical right 
as its strongest advocates, but what is perhaps most disturbing from our analysis is the extent to which 
the racism voiced by the radical right is used by the mainstream media and political actors as well.  
There is widespread consensus that Roma problem is just that: a problem, and the problem is with the 
Roma, and their deficient culture.  This in a sense relieves majority Hungarians of responsibility for 
accommodating the Roma.  Indeed, it becomes an argument for the non-tolerance of the Roma: their 
cultural deficiencies must not be tolerated any longer. 
 
This profound intolerance raises important questions about the relationship between racism and 
intolerance. To be sure, racism can be found in countries of immigration as well.  But whilst this 
racism typically only becomes explicit on the fringes in these other countries (claimed by the radical 
right or voiced on extremist websites), the Hungarian case shows how racism has gone mainstream in 
Hungary. The recent incidents we have examined in Hungary have been unscrupulously used to 
legitimate racism in ways that greatly expands the scope of intolerance. 
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